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The financial crisis that began in August 2007 turned into a recession in late 2008, and is 
now well on its way to being the longest and deepest downturn since the Great 
Depression.  There is a growing consensus that at certain critical times it has not been 
well managed.  This chapter deals with the four critical problems:  (a) monetary 
stimulation; (b) fiscal policy; (c) dealing with the foreclosure problem; and (d) rescuing 
failing financial institutions 
It was written in August, 2008, before the Lehmann Brothers bankruptcy, before 
the massive bank bailout, before Obama’s stimulus package and his foreclosure program.  
As this chapter goes to press, some eight months later, much has changed—but 
remarkably, much has stayed the same.  I have added at the end of three of the sections a 




Much of modern economic policy discussions begin with the premise that monetary 
policy should bear the brunt of the responsibility for stabilization.  Fiscal policy, it has 
been argued, moves too slowly.  By the time that a tax cut or stimulus package is enacted 
and implemented, the economy is likely to have turned around. 
But under current circumstances, monetary stimulus is likely to be ineffective, for 
several reasons, and even if it were effective, it is not obvious that it is desirable.  Over 
recent years, monetary policy has worked mainly by encouraging a housing bubble, 
which has sustained a consumption boom.  If monetary policy works through the same 
 2
channels, it is not clear that that is desirable—it will simply prolong the adjustment 
period.  No one wants to recreate another housing bubble. 
Moreover, monetary policy typically works by encouraging banks to lend more 
and lower interest rates.  Banks are not going to be willing and able to lend, given the 
impairment to their balance sheets and the uncertainties which they face—including 
uncertainties concerning their balance sheets.  Moreover, with prospects of a continued 
decline in real estate, it is not clear that households either will be willing to take more 
money out of their housing in mortgage equity withdrawals. 
Keynes long ago recognized that monetary policy is typically ineffective in a 
downturn.  He likened it to pushing on a string.  So far, interest rate reductions have had 
two effects:  (a) they may have contributed to a weaker dollar, thus helping export 
America’s problems to other countries.  From a global perspective, this is simply a new 
version of a “beggar thy neighbor” policy.  (b) Their actions may have prevented a 
meltdown of the financial markets—but at an unnecessarily high cost.  Preventing a 
meltdown is not the same as reigniting the economy. 
Today, monetary policy faces two further challenges:  increased liquidity in 
American (or European) markets does not necessarily translate into lower real interest 
rates—especially lower real medium or long term interest rates—if there is a belief that 
the lower interest rate will lead to higher inflation.  As interest rates were raised by the 
Fed in the period after 2003, it had less of an adverse effect than some had expected, 
because medium and longer term interest rates did not increase in tandem.  Today, we 
face the possibility that something similar will happen:  as interest rates are again 
lowered, medium and long-term interest rates may not fall.  They may even increase. 
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Secondly, increased liquidity in American (or European) markets does not 
necessary translate into increased investment expenditures in the U.S. (or Europe.)  The 
liquidity that is provided to financial markets can be spent wherever investors believe the 
returns are highest.  There are worries that the increased liquidity in Western financial 
markets will show up as increased demand for real estate assets in China and elsewhere 
in Asia. 
Even Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke seems to have given up on the notion that 
monetary policy can rekindle the economy.  The burden must shift to fiscal policy.  
Unfortunately, there has been little attention paid to basic economic principles in the 
design of the stimulus package. 
 
April 2008 Post-script 
 
The defining event in financial markets occurred a little over a month after our 
conference.  The Fed and Treasury let Lehman Brothers go bankrupt on September 15, 
with little thought to the ramifications, including to money market funds.  Rumors had 
been flying about the potential demise of Lehman Brothers at least since the fall of Bear 
Stearns.  The Fed and Treasury seemed to believe that markets should have prepared 
themselves for a collapse, but remarkably, they did not check on whether they had.  They 
had not.  With the failure of Lehman Brothers, a key money market fund “broke the 
buck”—i.e. was unable to pay back fully those who had deposited their money with the 
fund.  For a while, it suspended payment.  Panic broke out in the markets.  Shortly 
thereafter, AIG (American International Group) faced default before it was rescued.  It 
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was clear that the Fed and Treasury were veering from one strategy to another, without a 
clear set of principles.  No one could ascertain who would be bailed out or under what 
terms.  While there were vague references to bailing out systemically important 
institutions, some suspected having political connections was more relevant than 
systemic importance.  The AIG money, for instance, was passed onto “counterparties” to 
whom AIG had sold derivatives.  While the government initially hid where the money 
went, when it was eventually disclosed, it turned out that the biggest recipients were 
foreign banks—if they had been systemically important, and at risk, presumably their 
governments would have bailed them out.  Goldman Sachs was the largest American 
recipient, but it had claimed that it would have easily survived an AIG bankruptcy.  With 
Paulson having come from Goldman Sachs, and with its CEO reportedly having been in 
on the meetings discussing the AIG bailout, this seemed to confirm the political 
connections theory.  At this point, some $200 billion have gone to AIG.  In the final 
quarter of 2008, credit markets and lending seemed to tighten greatly, contributing to the 
downturn. 
In the ensuing months, the Fed pushed interest rates effectively down to zero to 
little effect.  Lending did not pick up.  The concerns that I expressed, that lowering the T-
bill rate would not translate into greater availability of credit at lower lending rates, has 
proven to be the case.  We have had a new version of a liquidity trap of the kind that 
Greenwald and Stiglitz [2003] pointed out.  Banks’ willingness and ability to lend, and 
the terms at which they lend, do not just depend on the T-bill rate or the monetary base.  
If their equity base is eroded, if they face high uncertainty in the value of their portfolio, 
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and if lending becomes highly risky, then credit availability may be restricted, and the 
spread between the T-bill rate and the lending rate may increase. 
What no one could have anticipated in August 2008 was the Fed’s willingness to 
move from being the lender of last resort, to the lender of first resort, as credit markets 
froze.  It more than tripled its balance sheet, taking onto its balance sheet assets that 
Central Banks normally shun.  It also began to undertake other measures, trying to 
change the term structure of interest rates—with some success.  Lower long term interest 
rates would, it would hope, help revive the real estate market. 
Together with the U.S. Treasury and other government agencies, the Fed also 
took actions to shore up the banking system, including extending guarantees to 
depositors.  These too helped prevent the collapse of the banking system, but did not 
restart lending and they may have contributed to another problem.  With deposits in U.S. 
banks guaranteed, some foreigners may have shifted their money to the United States.  
The dollar strengthened (at least for a while), hurting exports, already suffering as 




America needs a stimulus but it needs to be well designed and quick-acting (and if 
current trends continue, the same will be true for Europe).  Any stimulus will add to the 
deficit, and with the deficit soaring over the past seven years, it is especially important to 
have as big as bang for the buck as possible.  The stimulus should address long term 
problems—and at the very least, it should not make them worse.  If money is spent to 
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create an asset, the nation’s balance sheet may not be worsened—it may even be 
strengthened, as the increased liability from more government borrowing is matched by 
an asset. 
Automatic stabilizers—programs that lead to increased spending if and only if the 
economy goes into a downturn—are able to dose out the right medicine as the economy 
needs it.  America has one of the worst unemployment insurance systems among 
advanced industrialized countries.  It should begin by strengthening it not just because 
it’s the right thing to do but because money received by the unemployed would be spent 
immediately and so help the economy.  Unemployment insurance has the biggest bang 
for the buck. 
Unfortunately, states and localities are already beginning to feel the pinch—and 
will do so even more as property values fall.3  Typically, they cut back spending in 
tandem with the decrease in revenues (most states are required to have balanced budgets, 
and loath to raise taxes in the midst of a recession).  This acts as an automatic 
destabilizer.  The federal government needs to provide some assistance to the states and 
localities to prevent this from happening and even better, to help them address the 
striking inadequacies in infrastructure.  New Orleans levees and Minneapolis bridges are 
the tip of an iceberg:  we as a country have underinvested in infrastructure.  Spending on 
infrastructure would promote growth in the long run and strengthen the economy in the 
short run. 
The Bush Administration has long taken the view that tax cuts (especially 
permanent tax cuts for the rich) are the solution to every problem.  This is wrong.  The 
problem with tax cuts in general is that they perpetuate the excessive consumption that 
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has marked the American economy.  However, middle and lower income Americans have 
been suffering for the last seven years—median income is lower today than it was in 
2000.  A tax rebate targeted only at lower and middle income households makes sense, 
especially since it would be fast acting. 
There is some reason to be worried that the bang for the buck from tax rebates 
may be less than in previous occasions, because of the high level of indebtedness and the 
growing awareness of difficulties in obtaining credit going forward.  Many Americans 
can be expected to use some or all of their tax rebates to pay off some of their debts.  
There would be real benefits for their sense of security; and the financial system may 
benefit from a lower rate of defaults, but the stimulus to the economy, in terms of 
increased expenditures, may be less.4
It would be nice, of course, if we could stimulate investment in plant and 
equipment, not just in more housing.  Gut the standard ways of doing this are largely gifts 
to corporations for investment that they would otherwise have done—the bang for the 
buck is remarkably small.  It is possible to craft a more effective investment stimulus, a 
marginal investment tax credit, but in the past, the corporate sector has shown little 
interest in such measures.  It is the gift they want, not the stimulus. 
America’s infrastructure and public investment more generally, has been starved 
for a long time.  America should be engaged in R & D to reduce our dependency on oil, 
and should be investing more in public transportation.  These investments would bring 
triple dividends, not just the ordinary direct economic returns, but make us more energy 
secure, and, by reducing the demand for oil, could help drive down the price of oil.  Not a 
single one of the world’s top ten airports lies in the United States.  Studies show that the 
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returns to public investment in R & D are extra-ordinarily high.  These public 
investments would be complementary to private investments, and by increasing the 
returns to the private sector, actually encourage investment there. 
Other forms of public investment, such as in education, would stimulate the 
economy in the short run—far more than tax rebates would—and promote growth in the 
long run (again, far more than tax rebates.) 
In 2001, the Bush Administration used the impending recession as an excuse for 
the tax cuts for upper income Americans—the very group that had done so well over the 
preceding quarter century.  They were not designed to stimulate the economy, and they 
did so only to a limited extent.  Many of the country’s current woes can be traced to that 
decision.  To keep the economy going, the Fed was forced to lower interest rates in an 
unprecedented way, and to look the other way as America engaged in reckless lending. 
 The economy was sustained—on borrowed money–but it was unsustainable.  The 
example, unfortunately, was copied by other countries, and now the problems at the 
bottom are worse, especially with rising food and energy prices. 
We have described what a good stimulus program should focus on:  (a) 
maximizing the bang for the buck—the largest stimulant per dollar of deficit; (b) 
addressing the country’s long run problems; (c) be fast acting; and (d) create an asset to 
offset the liability of new debt. 
This time America, and other countries that face a slowdown, need a stimulus that 
stimulates.  We know how to design a stimulus that works and will help address some of 
America’s glaring problems, many of which (including the disparity between the rich and 
the poor) have only grown worse. 
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April 2008 Post-script 
 
In February 2008, the Obama Administration succeeded in getting a $787 billion stimulus 
bill passed without the support of any Republicans in the House and with the vote of 
three Republican Senators.  By then, the downturn was worsening, and it seemed clear 
that the stimulus would not be sufficient.  Moreover, it was not as well designed as 
hoped—partly in the vain attempt to get more Republican support.  About a third of the 
stimulus was in the form of household tax cuts, and with stock markets crashing and 
home prices falling, it seemed increasingly likely that much of the tax cuts would be 
saved (or spent to repay debt), rather than used to stimulate the economy. 
Much of the tax cut was back loaded—only about a quarter of the spending would 
occur in 2009—and the cutbacks in state and local spending were worse than I feared.  
California alone had cutbacks of $40 billion.  So much if not most of the 2009 stimulus at 
the federal level would be offset by a negative stimulus at the state and local level.  The 
worry was that the stimulus would not work, not because Keynesian economics was 
wrong, but because there was no real stimulus.  Some stimulus would be provided by the 
looming federal deficit, expected in 2009 to exceed 10 percent of GDP.  That in turn 
would be offset by the reductions in exports, the cutbacks in investment, growing 
unemployment, and large increases in household savings.  Most forecasters are now 
predicting a bleak year, even with the stimulus.) 
 
The Foreclosure Problem 
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Given that the problem in the financial sector originated with foreclosures, one might 
have thought that that problem would be the first to be addressed.  However, it has not 
been, and the number of anticipated foreclosures has been mounting.  What once seemed 
like high estimates—that a quarter of all homes would be underwater, with the value of 
the mortgage exceeding the value of the house—now seem conservative.5  Not all of 
these will default.  Yet unless something is done about the foreclosure problem, more 
mortgages will go into default, with follow-on consequences for the financial sector. 
 
Dealing with the current foreclosure problem:  a homeowner’s chapter 11 
 
There are a number of easy ways of dealing with the foreclosure problem—such as 
bailing out the lenders at the same time as writing down the loans—which, in the absence 
of budget constraints and worries about future moral hazard would make everyone (other 
than ordinary taxpayer) happy.  Individuals could stay in their homes and lenders would 
avoid taking a hit to their balance sheets.  Knowing that the government is taking this risk 
off of balance sheets would contribute to alleviating the credit crunch. 
The challenge is how to save the homes of the hundreds of thousands of those 
who otherwise would lose their homes, and not bail out the lenders, who should be made 
to bear the consequences of their failures to assess risk. 
One answer is a “homeowners’ chapter 11”—a speedy restructuring of liabilities 
of poorer homeowners, modeled on the kind of relief that we provide for corporations 
who cannot meet their debt obligations.  Chapter 11 is premised on the idea that keeping 
a firm going is critical for the firms’ workers and other stakeholders.  The firm’s 
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management can propose a corporate reorganization which the Courts review.  If found 
acceptable, there is a quick discharge of debt—the corporation is given a fresh start.  The 
homeowners’ chapter 11 is premised on the idea that no one gains from forcing a 
homeowner out of his home.  There are large transactions costs associated with 
foreclosure.   The house is often trashed, and surrounding houses decrease in value—
making further foreclosures more likely. 
This relief should be available for households with income below a critical 
threshold ($150,000) and with non-household, non-retirement wealth below some critical 
threshold (perhaps dependent on age).  The house would be appraised, and the 
individual’s debt would be written down to, say, 90 percent of the level of that appraisal 
(reflecting the fact that were the lender to have to proceed with foreclosure, there would 
be substantial transactions costs).  The borrower could then get an FHA (Federal Housing 
Administration) loan as described in the next section. 
Banks have resisted this proposal, because it would force them to recognize a 
loss.  They would rather hold on to the mortgage, hoping against hope that something 
will happen to revive housing prices.  Government bailouts have exacerbated the 
problem—the government has become an implicit (in the case of Citibank, explicit) 
insurer of large losses, while they would reap all the gains were real estate prices to 
revive. 
Treasury has resisted this proposal because if banks had to recognize the losses, 
more money would have to be put into the banks.  They too have been hoping that 
something will happen to avoid having to put more money into the banks. 
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Some have opposed this, suggesting it would be a windfall gain to those who 
purchased a home on speculation of an increase in house prices.  The criticism is a little 
odd, since in fact everyone in the market was speculating on an increase in real estate 
prices.  We have been willing, nonetheless, to bail out the banks.  But there is an easy 
way around this problem, one which would make the homeowners chapter 11 more fully 
analogous to corporate chapter 11:  a large fraction of the capital gain upon sale of the 
home would go to the lender.  In effect, there would be a debt-to-equity swap.  Those 
who bought a house mainly to speculate on the capital gain would find such a deal 
unattractive.  It acts as a self-selection device. 
 
Low interest loans 
 
A second important initiative to make home ownership more affordable is to provide 
lower interest rates.  One way of doing that is for the government to extend the benefits 
of its low cost access to fund homeowners.  The government has, in effect, been doing 
that with its bailout of Bear Stearns.  But why should it do that just for banks?  The 
government can borrow at a very low interest rate, lend it to homeowners at a rate 
slightly higher, and actually make a profit.  The fiscal position of the United States can be 
improved, at the same time that the foreclosure rate can be reduced. 
Banks have resisted this initiative as well, and again, for an obvious reason:  they 
don’t want competition from the government, even if they have proven to have done so 
poorly at credit assessment and mortgage design to have put at risk the entire economy. 
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Expanded homeownership initiatives 
 
Advocates of the reckless sub-prime mortgages argued that these financial innovations 
would enable large numbers of Americans to become homeowners for the first time.  
They did become homeowners—but for a very short time, and at a very high cost.  The 
fraction of Americans that will be homeowners at the end of this episode is likely to be 
lower than at the beginning.  The objective of expanding homeownership is, I believe, a 
worthy one, but clearly the market route has not worked well—except for the mortgage 
brokers and investment banks that profited from them. 
Many conservatives have blamed the home ownership initiatives for the crisis.  
But that is wrong.  No government official encouraged the banks to lend to individuals 
beyond their ability to repay.  The lenders were supposed to do appropriate credit 
assessment.  They failed—partly because of the flawed incentive structures noted in the 
previous chapter.  Moreover, the worst practices did not occur in government housing 
programs (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.)  The private sector showed that it did not need 
any government assistance to engage in bad lending practices.  Indeed, many in the 
mortgage industry resisted laws that would have restricted the predatory lending practices 
that played a major role in the crisis. 
The underlying problem is simple to state:  median household income has been 
falling, and house prices rising.  This means that housing is becoming less and less 
affordable to more and more Americans.  There are no easy fixes to the declining 
incomes—other than shifting the burden of taxation away from these individuals and 
towards those who have been doing well.  Nor is there any way—short of public housing 
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programs—that we can quickly reduce housing prices (the market correction currently 
going on is likely to make housing more affordable). 
At the current time, there is an argument for helping lower and middle income 
Americans temporarily with their housing costs (over the longer run, there is a question 
about whether it is appropriate to distort the allocation of resources to housing).  Note 
that America (and many other countries) does this with upper income individuals—tax 
deductibility of mortgages and property taxes means than the government pays a large 
fraction of the carrying costs.  But ironically, it does not do that with those who need the 
help the most. 
A simple remedy is converting the current mortgage and property tax deduction 
into a flat rate cashable tax credit; the reduction in the subsidy to upper income 
Americans could help pay for the subsidy for poorer Americans.  Even better would be a 
progressive subsidy, with a higher rate for the poor than the rich.  A 25 percent tax credit 
would increase the affordability of housing for many Americans.  A complementary 





Ironically, the financial sector, for all of its claims at innovation, has not innovated in 
ways which are directed at shifting risk from poor Americans to those who are more able 
to bear the risk.  For instance, even if mortgages have variable rates, poor Americans 
struggling to make ends meet need to know what their monthly payments are going to be.  
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One can have fixed payments, even with variable rate mortgages, if one lets the maturity 
of the mortgage be variable. 
Danish mortgage markets have provided an alternative which has worked well for 
that country for more than two centuries. 
The government has repeatedly had to take the initiative in innovating financial 
products (like making mortgages widely available) that meet the needs of ordinary 
citizens.  When they are proven, the private sector often steps in.  This may be another 
instance where government will have to take the initiative because of the failure of the 




There is little, at this juncture, that government can do to prevent large numbers of 
mortgages from going “underwater,” i.e. the mortgage will exceed the value of the 
property.  But not all properties that are underwater will go into foreclosure.  In a world 
with full rationality and perfect pricing, clearly individuals who see that the value of the 
house is less than the value of the mortgage should default:  they can buy another (or the 
same) house at the lower price, and will be better off at least by the amount that the house 
is underwater.  But individuals care about their reputation, and many will be reluctant to 
go into foreclosure.  That is why the kinds of programs described in the previous section 
may help:  if they can stay in their homes and meet their mortgage payments, they will try 
to do so. 
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There are other proposals that affect incentives to default.  One proposal (due to 
Martin Feldstein) would exchange, say, 20 percent of the individual’s current mortgage 
for a lower interest rate government loan (the government could pass on the advantage of 
its lower borrowing rate, so that the program would not cost the government anything).  
But the government loan would not be a non-recourse loan, so that even if the individual 
defaulted on his house, he would still be obliged to repay.  There would then be little 
incentive to default.  Individuals would only default when the price of the house was 
lower than the non-recourse debt, and for that to happen would require a very large fall in 
real estate prices. 
One interesting aspect of the proposal is that it implicitly recognizes a market 
failure in financial markets—that the government has an advantage, both in raising funds 
(because of the almost zero probability of default) and in collecting.  These have 
provided part of the rationale for government student loan programs and government 
mortgages; and yet the right has often insisted that the government not engage in these 
financial activities. 
Beyond that, this proposal would, in effect, be giving a large gift to lenders—in 
effect, homeowners would be asked to give up their option, in return for a lower interest 
rate.  Most likely, financially unsophisticated borrowers would not understand the market 
value of the option, and would only see the reduced payments.  In a sense, the 
government would be duplicitous, unless it informed them of the value of the option. 
However, a slight modification of this proposal would reduce the likelihood of 
foreclosure at the same time that it would not be giving such an unwarranted transfer to 
lenders.  The government could act as an intermediary, allowing lenders to buy back the 
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option at a fair market value (thereby reducing the uncertainty which they and markets 
face), and encourage households to do so (a) using (most of) the proceeds to buy down 
the value of the outstanding mortgage; and (b) convert another 10 percent to 20 percent 
of the mortgage into a recourse loan with interest at the government interest rate (plus an 
appropriate transactions cost).  Lenders participating in this program would, of course, 
have to waive any pre-payment penalties. 
 
April 2008 Post-script 
 
I had watched with amazement as the crisis worsened, and President Bush refused to do 
anything about the underlying problem, the mortgages.  Providing $700 billion to the 
banks without doing anything about the mortgages was akin to a mass blood transfusion 
to a patient suffering from internal hemorrhaging. 
President Obama finally came forward with a proposal to deal with the 
foreclosure problem in February 2009.  It was an important step in the right direction—
but not enough to likely prevent large numbers of foreclosures still occurring.  There 
were limited mortgage restructurings, for those who went through bankruptcy 
proceedings.  Ironically, prior law made it more difficult to restructure a mortgage on a 
primary residence than on a yacht.  Many individuals will, however, resist going through 
bankruptcy, with all that that entails.  The Homeowners Chapter 11 was intended to 
facilitate the process and give homeowners better terms. 
With the government take-over of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, it is easier for 
government to restructure many mortgages.  It also provided access to lower interest 
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rates.  But the private sector still seems reluctant to renegotiate many mortgages, and has 
been successful in restricting the scope of government low-interest loans.  The Obama 
plan provided some (very limited) incentives for banks to restructure certain mortgages. 
The major objection to the Obama initiative is that the restructurings involve temporarily 
lower interest rates, not lower principal—yet the underlying problem is that the price of 
the house is less than the value of the mortgage.  With prices less than mortgages, 
incentives to default are strong, and the evidence is clear that those with mortgages 
underwater are more likely to default.  Yet not only was the principle not written down, 
no direct incentives (e.g. of the kind discussed above) were put in place aimed at 
reducing foreclosures.  The first is explicable partly because the renegotiation of principle 
would force the recognition by the banks of their losses, and as we have noted, the banks 
are going to great lengths to avoid that—supported by Treasury. 
In the beginning of April, 2009, the Financial Accounting Standards Board took 
an action which weakened further incentives to renegotiate mortgages.  It gave banks 
greater latitude not to write down the value of impaired mortgages.  This meant that the 
cost of renegotiating mortgages effectively went up—because renegotiation would entail 
recognizing losses, which in turn would entail finding new funds for recapitalization. 
This compounded problems from the flawed bank restructuring, described in the next 
section.  Part of that program entailed government guarantees on losses.  With such 
guarantees, there were strong incentives for delay, for any gain would accrue to the 






Given the magnitude of defaults on the sub-prime mortgages, it is not surprising that 
these problems became translated into problems elsewhere in the system.  Given the lack 
of transparency in the banks—who had moved so much of their risk taking off balance 
sheet—it is especially not a surprise that there was a “run” on a bank, with market 
participants pulling their money out (not rolling over loans).  Even if they would have 
eventually fully recovered their assets, the risk of having their money tied up for an 
extended period of litigation, at a time when credit was tight, was simply not worth the 
slightly higher returns that they might receive. 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003)6 and Gallegati et al. (2007)7 have emphasized the 
importance of credit interlinkages, and how defaults in one part of the system can lead to 
defaults elsewhere.  It is easy to construct models of bankruptcy avalanches.  The fear 
was that a default by Bear Stearns would lead to a series of other defaults, and a run on 
other banks.  Indeed, even after Bear Stearns was bailed out (through a Fed financed 
acquisition by J.P. Morgan) the fear of further defaults was so great that the Fed extended 
its lender of last resort facility to investment banks.  Even most critics of the Fed agreed 
that, at that point, it had no choice.  It may have failed in providing an adequate 
regulatory structure; it almost surely failed in acting too late.  But given the risks at that 
moment, a bailout seemed inevitable. 
The criticism is the form of the bailout, which entailed potentially huge transfers 
of wealth to J.P. Morgan and large transfers to Bear Stearns shareholders, while taxpayers 
were put at risk for large amounts without any compensation.  If taken as a precedent, it 
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expanded the scope of moral hazard, rewarding those who had engaged in excessively 
risky behavior and had been already richly compensated.  The defense that something had 
to be done quickly was hardly a defense:  that there were potential problems had long 
been recognized, and it is hard to believe that contingency plans had not been thought 
through.  Wall Street wanted a bailout, and Wall Street got a bailout; perhaps not as 
extensive as they had hoped, but still on terms that were unconscionable, in a manner that 
was not transparent, and that seemingly paid little attention to the large distributions of 
wealth that were generated.  Conflicts of interest (bordering on corruption) abounded.8  
 The bailout took the form of a non-recourse loan from the Fed to J.P. Morgan to 
acquire Bear Stearns (originally for $236 million, upped to $1.2 billion).  The Fed gave 
$30 billion to J.P. Morgan, and got what was supposed to be an equivalent amount in 
collateral consisting of a mélange of assets, including subprime mortgages.  No one is 
sure how they were priced.  If the value of the assets falls below $29 billion, J.P. Morgan 
absorbs the first billion of losses, but taxpayers are at risk for the remainder (and 
obviously, for the first billion, if J.P. Morgan itself were to go bankrupt). 
Non-recourse loans are, in effect, put options.  If the value of the collateral goes 
below $29 billion, J.P. Morgan has little incentive to pay back the loan.  In discussing the 
risk, attention has focused on the probability of default, particularly important because no 
one is sure how they were priced in the first place, i.e. what probability of default was 
built into the pricing.  But there is a second problem:  interest rate risk.  If interest rates 
rise, then the value of the assets declines.  Some of these assets are 30 year mortgages, 
meaning that they are highly sensitive to long term interest rates.  Providing a non-
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recourse loan even if the assets are currently correctly priced is like giving away an 
option—an option with a very high value. 
Particularly irksome was that the government stood to lose large amounts of 
money (both on the credit risk and the interest rate risk), but there was no upside 
potential.  Meanwhile, Bear Stearns shareholders walked away with $1.2 billion, less than 
they would have liked, but still more than they should have, especially given their failure 
to manage risk appropriately. 
There were many ways that the taxpayers could have been protected, and at least 
received some compensation.  For instance, shareholder value could have been put into 
escrow, until it was clear that taxpayers’ money was not at risk.  The first $1.25 of losses 
would be paid either by J.P. Morgan or by shareholders.  J.P. Morgan could have been 
asked to pay a risk premium up front, and to pay the market value of the implicit put.  If 
the collateral turned out to be more valuable than the value assigned to it, the government 
could have demanded a fraction of the excess. 
Bailing out Bear Stearns also entailed large redistributions.  Many had bet on Bear 
Stearns going into bankruptcy (in credit default swaps).  Those that had bought insurance 
against this risk (bet that it would happen) were deprived of money that they otherwise 
would have received; those that provided the insurance received a windfall gain.  This 
market is itself not very transparent, but allegedly among those who received large 
windfall gains were the big investment banks—including J.P. Morgan.  In defense of the 
bailout, one could argue that the risk of a bailout should have been priced into the 
insurance in the first place.  Still, the fact that J.P. Morgan was, in part being bailed out 
should have played into the terms at which the bailout occurred. 
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The events subsequent to the bailout evidenced many of the potential conflicts of 
interest.  The CEO of Bear Stearns was hired by J.P. Morgan, at handsome compensation.  
Clearly, a promise (pay-off) of this kind could interfere with his ability to negotiate in the 
best interests of the shareholders.  Shareholders had to vote on the acquisition.  But it is 
easy to show that those who had sold insurance against the risk of Bear Stearns going 
bankrupt had an incentive to buy shares, to ensure that the acquisition went through, even 
if shareholders as a whole might have thereby been disadvantaged.9
The bailout orchestrated by the regulators illustrates a problem common to 
discretionary regulatory policy, an issue that arose in the bailout of Long Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) a decade earlier, where no public money was involved.  The 
regulator has a variety of carrots and sticks for inducing cooperation.  Lack of 
cooperation can induce tighter scrutiny; fuller cooperation can buy regulatory 
forbearance, now or in the future.  In the case of LTCM, banks were induced to 
contribute funds to bailout the hedge fund benefiting, not necessarily incidentally, many 
of the corporate executives of the same banks who were contributing money (another 
instance of the complex web of conflicts of interest).  Was participation in the bailout in 
the best interests of the shareholders?  The New York Fed believed it was in the interests 
of the system as a whole.  Whether the individual banks agreed, and whether it was in the 
best interests of the individual participating bank, is another matter. 
In the case at hand, this combined with lack of transparency to leave a high level 
of uncertainty:  it does not appear that J.P. Morgan got a bad deal; on the contrary.  But 
was it because it outsmarted the Fed?  Because there were relatively few institutions able 
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and willing to take over Bear Stearns, and the Fed wanted, at any cost, to avoid a 
collapse, and so, given exigencies of the moment, it could drive a hard bargain. 
There were several alternative courses.  One which the U.K. eventually took (though the 
delay in doing so may have cost it a great deal) is nationalization.  Whether the legal 
framework would have allowed the U.S. to do this may not be clear; but it was not clear 
whether the Bear Stearns bailout was legal. 
It is curious that it has become acceptable for a foreign government, or, 
equivalently, a fund owned by a foreign government, to bailout (or take over) a failing 
bank (as happened in the case of Merrill Lynch and Citibank), but there is still a 
reluctance to allow one’s own government to do so   The standard rationale against 
governments running/nationalizing banks is ideological:  governments shouldn’t do it; the 
private sector is better at running banks and other such enterprises than the public sector.  
But the private sector has, in these instances, demonstrated its incompetence.  The public 
purse is at risk.  The government has a large stake in how the resolution is managed.  
Indeed, with implicit or explicit deposit insurance, it has more at stake than anyone else 
does.  Yet it is difficult to provide incentives for any private firms that are compatible 
with the interests of the state.  It is far better to have the government manage the 
resolution.  In the case of Bear Stearns, the public interest was even more complicated.  
There was a public interest in maintaining the integrity of the financial system.  There 
were no formal liabilities, as in the case of deposit insurance.  What was required may not 
have been clear.  In the event, there was a huge transfer of wealth to J.P. Morgan to 
ensure that this was done. 
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(There is a rationale for encouraging foreign government bailouts:  the arms length 
bargaining ensures that the foreign government is not likely to be engaged in hidden 
transfers of wealth, as may have happened in the Bear Stearns bailout, and as has 
happened in bailouts in many countries.  On the other side, one of the concerns of 
government ownership of banks is that resources get directed according to political, not 
economic objectives.  This should presumably be more acceptable if it is one’s own 
government’s political agenda (though, as I have explained elsewhere10, if there are 
concerns about resources being used in ways that go counter to public interest, it is a sign 
of an inadequate regulatory framework—the problems could arise as well with domestic 
private ownership). 
There were still other alternatives:  the government could have lent to Bear 
Stearns directly.  This would have been more transparent.  And it would have been easier 
to design a system of allowing the government to participate in the upside potential, as 
the government did when it helped engineer Chrysler’s bailout.  Still a third alternative, 
more akin to the Chrysler bailout, would be providing a public guarantee to private funds, 
though—other than ideology—it is not clear why this is preferable to the direct provision 
of government funds. 
Again, in the instance, it may not have been consistent with the legal framework, 
though the Fed’s announcement that, going forward, it stood willing to lend to other 
investment banks, suggested that it believed that it did have regulatory authority.  The 
issue here is the design of the appropriate framework:  it would seem desirable to give 
government the right to lend, in return for taking a share of the potential gain or at 
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sufficiently high interest rates to compensate for the risk that the collateral was less than 
the value assigned.11 12
Ownership is often defined as the residual claimant on the returns to an asset and 
residual control.  Current banking frameworks leave the government as the residual 
holder of negative claims and, in effect, with considerable residual control rights—when 
things turn out badly, but not when they turn out well.  They can run things once the 
patient gets to the hospital, but they pick up the hospital bills, and can do little (or at least 
not enough) to prevent the accidents that lead to hospitalization.13  This seems neither 
efficient nor equitable; and in many countries, such policies have resulted in huge 
transfers of resources from the public to the private sector (e.g. in Mexico’s banking 
crisis). 
 
Further comments on equity injections, capital adequacy standards, and forbearance 
 
Typically, financial injections into the banking system occur before the actual meltdown, 
while the bank is viable, but has failed to meet its regulatory capital adequacy standards.  
Banks facing such a situation can be forced to comply.  Again, typically, when banks face 
a problem of inadequate capital in an economic downturn, they have found it difficult to 
raise the required capital.  Part of the reason is (as here) the uncertainty concerning the 
value of the assets and liabilities—made even worse here because of the lack of 
transparency in off balance sheet accounting and the complexity of products.  Part of the 
reason is that in downturns, uncertainty is heightened and there is a general scarcity of 
liquid funds for the bailout. 
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In early 2008, it appeared that the current instance may be an exception, or may 
be a harbinger of a new world.  The world was awash with liquidity—in fact excess 
liquidity was often blamed for the problems.  In several instances, sovereign wealth funds 
came to the rescue.  In today’s world of globalization, it appeared that banks could turn to 
the global financial market.  Funds may be scarce in the United States, but there is a 
whole world to turn to outside the United States.  There may be another factor at play:  
the banks being bailed out are controlled by their managers.  Their interests may not fully 
coincide with those of their shareholders.  The managers may have been more willing to 
give up a greater share in the ownership of the bank to save the institution.  On the other 
hand, the sovereign wealth funds may have been more willing to pay more than a typical 
risk averse buyer, focused on the actuarial value of the assets and their risk, to obtain a 
large share in these iconic assets. 
But by late 2008, these hopes of a new world of global finance coming to the 
rescue seemed a dream of a distant past.  The sovereign wealth funds which had invested 
in America, and especially in its banks, had been badly burned.  They had learned how 
non-transparent the institutions were and how great the uncertainty about the true state of 
their balance sheet.  Besides, the downturn had turned global, and many of the countries 
with liquid funds began to focus more on problems within their own region. 
In the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) strongly 
urged government regulators to strictly enforce capital adequacy standards.  I argued that 
such a policy could be counterproductive; if the banks couldn’t raise additional capital, it 
would force a contraction of their loan portfolio, further deepening the economic 
downturns, and possibly even worsening balance sheets, contributing to a downward 
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spiral.  The IMF policy of no-forbearance was, in effect, instituting an automatic 
destabilizer into the economy. 
One of the challenges in designing a regulatory regime based on capital adequacy 
standards is how to prevent this destabilizing behavior.  One proposal is to introduce 
countercyclical standards, i.e. that automatically loosen the standards when the economy 
is weak, and tighten them when the economy is strong.  This proposal is discussed in the 
previous chapter and elsewhere in this book.14
Some urged government capital injections, and with these capital adequacy 
standards could be met, and a few countries took this course.  Capital adequacy standards 
are supposed to serve two functions:  they ensure that the bank has enough capital at risk 
that it does not take on excessive risk, and it provides a buffer, so that the government 
does not have to put up as much money should things turn out badly.  When the 
government puts up money to meet the capital adequacy standards, it is doing little to 
protect taxpayers’ money:  if it puts the money in the form of equity, its money is now at 
risk even if the bank survives, but simply gets a low return.  But more important is the 
fact that incentives are little affected:  controlling shareholders care about their wealth, 
not the wealth of the government; what they have at risk is unchanged.  Indeed, it can be 
shown that under some circumstances, incentives are adversely affected.  The existence 
of capital adequacy standards lowers the franchise value of a firm (it is a constraint 
imposed on the firm, and therefore has to lower owners’ expected discounted (utility of) 
future income), and dilutes existing shareholders claims on future franchise value.  As a 
result, the bank may even engage in more risky behavior (at the expense of taxpayers).15
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Restricting hidden bail-outs 
 
Increasingly, there are concerns that the Fed currently is too centered on bailing out ailing 
banks and financial institutions (and possibly even those losing money on the stock 
market) and less with maintaining the real strength of the economy. 
This perspective was put forward by Princeton economics professor Uwe Reinhardt, in a 
letter to the Financial Times (February 21, p 10): 
 
You report (Ft.com, February 18) that the Federal Reserve has quietly lent 
U.S. banks “on relatively attractive terms” some $50bn to ease the credit 
crunch now befalling main street American business…Would it not have 
been more efficient for the Fed to have lent the $50bn directly to main 
street business, on similarly subsidized terms, in place of feeding horses 
that may or may not feed the birds?  After all, unlike most solid real 
businesses, banks worldwide have amply demonstrated their inability to 
fully understand and value the assets—often just casino-like bets—into 
which they place the enormous sums entrusted to them...I realize, of 
course, that the Fed’s lending directly to Main Street would immediately 
be decried as “socialism” in our financial press.  Miraculously, when the 
Fed bails out inept private banks on subsidized terms it is called 
“prudence” rather than socialism.  That may fool seasoned adults, but not 
any straight-thinking freshman in economics. 
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The fact is that when the Fed buys mortgages and other assets that are not widely traded, 
there is a risk that it will be overpaying—the lack of transparency should itself be a 
concern in a democratic society.  It is understandable why the Fed wanted to do 
something about the freezing of credit markets; it is understandable that those in the 
affected institutions wanted a bailout.  However, it was incumbent on the Fed to do so in 
ways which do not put at risk taxpayers money16, and which do not reward the financial 
institutions for their behavior.  The fact is that the financial markets created these non-
transparent hard-to-price financial instruments; they should now bear the consequences.  
If the Fed has used only a small fraction of the financial ingenuity that went into the 
creation of the mess, it could have protected American taxpayers against the risks; it 
could, for instance, have insisted that the banks from which it bought these mortgage 
backed instruments provide insurance that, should the value of these instruments decline, 
e.g. as a result of an increase in default rates, the banks would make the Fed whole.  One 
could only surmise that it deliberately decided not to protect American taxpayers; and 
that it may have done so because what was desired was a bailout. 
Congress should consider passing legislation to ensure that when the Fed engages 
in such risky transactions, American taxpayers are protected, and that whatever it does, 
should be done more transparently.  Similar legislation should be undertaken in other 
countries. 
In the transition from Communism to the market economy, it became clear how 
government’s control of the banking system (either directly through ownership of banks, 
or indirectly, through the granting of bank licenses and regulatory supervision) affected 
the wealth distribution:  those, and only those, who had access to capital could buy the 
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assets, typically at far below prices that represented fair market value.  The question is, 
today, is Central Bank liquidity doing something similar, though admittedly on a far less 
grand scale.  If the Central Bank lends money to Bank A, and Bank A lends money to 
Hedge Fund Alpha, and Hedge Fund Alpha uses some of the money to buy shares in 
Bank B, and at the same time, the Central Bank lends money to Bank B, and Bank B 
lends money to Hedge Fund Beta, and Hedge Fund Beta uses some of the money to buy 
shares in Bank A, we can recapitalize both Bank A and Bank B.  It is a private sector 
recapitalization—of course all funded by the government, but with a set of smoke and 
mirrors so confusing that no one (outside a few skeptic economists—and who pays 
attention to them anyway) can figure out what is going on.  The wonderful thing about 
this charade is that it perpetuates the longstanding dogma:  privatize assets while 
socializing risk.  If the banks do well, the hedge funds walk off with the profits; if the 
banks do poorly, the taxpayers pick up the pieces. 
Is this really what is happening?  In a sense, one can’t really answer that question:  
funds are fungible.  We don’t have a clear view of what would have happened but for the 
extra liquidity provided to the banking system.  What is clear is that the extra liquidity 
makes the recapitalization of the banking system easier. 
 
April 2009 Post-script 
 
The weaknesses in America’s banking system turned out to be far worse than most 
imagined, even in August 2008.  Then, it was clear that there were massive losses on sub-
prime mortgages.  It was clear too that problems would be spreading to other mortgages, 
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and to other forms of credit.  It was clear too that the losses that had been taken were far 
smaller than the total losses.  There were a lot of losses somewhere in the system, some 
in America’s banks, some outside. 
The Bush Administration finally realized that something had to be done, asked for 
a blank check of $700 billion with no Congressional oversight or judicial review.  
Congress eventually gave Treasury close to a blank check, but insisted on some 
oversight.  Treasury and Fed continued to vacillate in their views about what to do.  First, 
they argued for a “cash for trash” proposal, entailing the government buying off the 
“toxic assets.”  They were eventually persuaded that such a proposal would not work—
the process of buying them off separately would be too slow.  They then tried direct 
“equity injections,” giving the banks money in return for preferred shares, and some 
warrants, to give at least some upside sharing of potential gains.  The terms that the U.S. 
government got, however, in these deals was very bad.  The Congressional Oversight 
Panel estimated that at the time the value of the shares and warrants was about 2/3 the 
value of the money given to the banks.  When the program (called TARP, troubled asset 
recovery program) was initiated, there was much talk that the government would not only 
get its money back, but make a profit.  A few months later, the Congressional Budget 
Office estimated that the government would get back less than 50 percent of what it gave 
the banks.  Clearly, prospects of recovering the money with adequate compensation for 
risk and the time value of money were nil. 
While it was clear that TARP would lead to substantial increases in the 
government’s national debt, the hope was that it would lead to more lending.  It did not.  
The new Obama Administration’s economic team, dominated by those who had 
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advocated policies that had led to the mess and/or regulators who had failed to do an 
adequate job of oversight, and seen to be too close to the failing banks, continued the 
policy of shoveling out money to the banks.  The new deals that it struck with the banks 
were even worse for the taxpayer.  Some of them, entailing underwriting losses, distorted 
incentives. 
In late March 2009, they came up with a new program, a private public 
partnership, where the government provided or guaranteed most of the funds, thereby 
absorbing most of the losses, but the private sector shared in 50 percent of the gains as 
the Partnerships bought off assets from the banks.  The Administration sold it as using the 
private sector to help “discover” the true value of the assets, but the structure of the 
Partnership meant that the private sector was only finding the value of the upside 
potential of the assets; the value of the option, with the government absorbing most of the 
losses, was obviously much greater than the value of the asset.  The gains to the banks 
were at the expense of the taxpayers.  It was a costly redistribution of the banks, one 
which at the same time distorted incentives. 
If the program worked, it would only be at a very high cost to the nation’s debt, 
and at an unnecessarily high cost.  Even with such massive redistributions, there was 
concern that the program might not work, partly because the banks were allowed to keep 
the toxic (“impaired”) mortgages on their books at over-inflated prices.  Even if they 
could sell them at prices that were greatly in excess of their true value, the best prices 
they could get for them might be considerably less than the value on their books, and that 
would force them to recognize the losses, which in turn would force them to raise more 
capital. 
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There was an alternative—the usual bank “bankruptcy” procedure, entailing 
temporary nationalization, with the government honoring obligations to insured 
depositors, but with shareholders and unsecured creditors facing losses.  Obviously, the 
shareholders of those banks likely to go under and their friends did not take warmly to 
this proposal.  They preferred the Bush-Obama plan of continued bailouts, with 
government getting little in return—little in the way of finance, little in the way of 
control.  Yet with banks having misused so much of the money they received—to 
continue to pay dividends or to pay outside bonuses seemingly for record losses—as this 
book goes to press, it is not clear whether this will be politically feasible.  It is certainly 
not economically desirable.  The normal procedures of financial reorganization would be 
far preferable to this form of ersatz capitalism (or corporate welfarism); entailing 
socializing losses while privatizing profits.  We were, in effect, confusing the issue of 
bailing out banks with the issue of bailing out bankers and their shareholders. 
The bank rescue plan is the weakest part of the response of the new 
Administration to the crisis.  Prospect of lending being resuscitated remains weak; 
prospects of large burdens on the government remain high.  Even if banks’ ability to lend 
is restored, their willingness to do so may not be.  Resuscitating the banks may be 




The financial crisis in America has grown into a global economic crisis, the worst since 
the Great Depression.  As this book goes to Press, it is not clear how deep the downturn 
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will get, how long it will last, or how robust will be the recovery.  America’s recovery 
will, almost surely, depend in part in what happens elsewhere in the world.  Nevertheless, 
what seems clear at this juncture is that the downturn will be longer and deeper because 
of the failure of the Bush Administration to design an effective response.  It refused to do 
anything about the mortgages.  When it came to a stimulus, it went back to its time worn 
view that a tax cut was the appropriate medicine for any economy’s ills.  When it came to 
the ailing banks, it veered erratically from one course of action (or inaction) to another. 
The new Administration finally came up with a stimulus package that might 
work—but it was too little, and not well designed.  It came up with a mortgage 
restructuring program—but it too was too little, and not designed to address one of the 
key problems, that of mortgages that were underwater.  Its real failure was coming up 
with an effective program to restart lending.  It focused on the past, dealing with the 
“legacy” assets, rather than looking forward.  It was too influenced by the interests, 
concerns, and perspectives of the banks.  It took a calculated risk:  perhaps a policy that 
pleased them would manage to get us over the crisis, smoothly, without generating too 
much resentment from the rest of society, and at not too great of a cost to the taxpayer.  It 
may work, but as this book goes to press, it looks increasingly unlikely that that gamble 
will pay off.  The cost to the taxpayer is high, public resentment is mounting, and it’s not 
working.  It is, of course, not too late for the new Administration to change course. 
This is, in part, a crisis in confidence—confidence in our financial system has eroded.  
But if it appears that our financial system has managed to capture the government for its 
own interests, then confidence in our government will be equally eroded. 
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